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Since at least the seventeenth century, courts have required that 
confessions or admissions be corroborated by independent evidence 
to be admissible at trial.  After the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces decided United States v. Adams, a case interpreting 
the military’s version of the corroboration rule, Congress quickly took 
action in response.  Within months, Congress passed a law directing 
the President to rewrite the military’s corroboration rule, and a new 
rule was subsequently promulgated.  Why was Congress so intent on 
overruling a military appellate court’s interpretation of an ancient 
and obscure rule of evidence?  What was wrong with the court’s 
former corroboration rule?  What does the new rule do differently?  
This Article seeks to answer those questions.  This Article concludes 
that the impetus for amending the rule was an effort to control the 
impact that the court’s interpretation of the corroboration rule would 
have on sexual assault prosecutions.  Further, after analyzing the old 
and new corroboration rules, this Article concludes that the new rule, 
as promulgated by the President, has the effect of overturning Adams 
and likely returns the corroboration rule back to what it had been 
prior to the Adams decision. 
 
* Captain Seth M. Engel is a Judge Advocate in the United States Marine Corps.  Captain 
Engel is a graduate of the United States Army Judge Advocate General’s School, LLM., 2017; 
Cornell Law School, J.D., 2011; and Purdue University, B.A., 2008.  The views and opinions 
expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position 
of the U.S. Marine Corps, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
 
220 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:219 
INTRODUCTION 
In April 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces (C.A.A.F.) decided United States v. Adams.1  Interpreting and 
applying Military Rule of Evidence (MRE) 304(c) was the sole issue in 
the case—the rule requiring that an accused’s confession or admission be 
corroborated in order for it to be admissible at trial in military courts.2  
Although one would expect a decision regarding a rule that has been 
referred to as a “dusty doctrine of criminal law” to go largely unnoticed,3 
it turned out not to be the case.  Only three weeks after Adams was 
decided, legislation was introduced in the United States Senate to rewrite 
the military’s corroboration requirement in an effort to overturn Adams.4  
A version of that legislation was ultimately included in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (FY16 NDAA), directing 
the President to rewrite the military’s corroboration rule to conform with 
federal practice.5  Just over a year after the decision in Adams, President 
Barack Obama promulgated a new MRE 304(c) corroboration rule.6 
Why did a military appellate court’s interpretation of the military’s 
version of an obscure rule of evidence garner so much attention from 
Congress?  What was the old rule and how did Adams interpret it?  What 
is different about the new corroboration rule, and how is a confession 
corroborated under the new rule?  Finally, is the new rule consistent with 
 
1. United States v. Adams, 74 M.J. 137, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (reversing the admission of 
part of the accused’s confession where that part of the confession was not corroborated by other 
evidence), superseded by rule as stated in United States v. Berry, No. ACM S32351, 2015 WL 
13122297 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2017); see Exec. Order No. 13,730, 81 Fed. Reg. 33,331, 
33,350 (May 20, 2016) [hereinafter Order 13,730]. 
2. See Adams, 74 M.J. at 139–41. 
3. United States v. Brown, 617 F.3d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 2010). 
4. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, S. 1376, 114th Cong. 
§ 546 (as reported by S. Comm. on Armed Servs., May 19, 2015). 
5. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, 
§ 545, 129 Stat. 726, 820 (2015).  The original version of the bill directed that four substantive 
changes be made to the corroboration rule, whereas the bill that was passed directed that the 
rule be rewritten to conform with the corroboration rule as used in federal district courts without 
explaining what the federal practice is, or what changes would be necessary for the rule to 
conform with federal practice.  Compare National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2016, S. 1376, 114th Cong. § 546 (as reported by S. Comm. on Armed Servs., May 19, 2015), 
with National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 545, 129 
Stat. 726, 820 (2015). 
6. See Order 13,730, supra note 1, at 33,350–51 (amending MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, UNITED STATES MIL. R. EVID. 304(g) (2012) [hereinafter 2012 MCM]).  The text of 
MRE 304(c) prior to its amendment, after the amendment, and a line-in/line-out version of MRE 
304(c) are contained in the appendices.  See infra app. A (providing the text of MRE 304(c) 
promulgated on May 20, 2016); app. B (providing the text of MRE 304(c) prior to May 20, 
2016); app. C (showing the line-in/line-out version of changes made to MRE 304(c)). 
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Congress’s intent?  This Article seeks to answer those questions and 
concludes that the reason Congress acted so quickly in overruling Adams 
was due to the impact that its interpretation of the rule would have had on 
the ability of the military to prosecute servicemembers accused of sexual 
assault.  Namely, after Adams, there was a risk that the military would not 
be able to prosecute servicemembers in some sexual assault cases, even in 
instances where there was a confession.7 
The old corroboration rule was easy to understand superficially but 
notoriously difficult to apply.8  Practitioners, courts, and commentators 
have long struggled to understand the rule and apply it consistently.9  The 
text of the rule was at odds with how many courts actually applied it.  In 
Adams, the C.A.A.F. sought to provide clarity and strictly adhere to the 
text of the rule.10  The new rule substantially changes the text of the rule 
and upends the progress made in the old corroboration rule’s 
interpretation.  After analyzing the new rule, this Article concludes, in 
practical effect, the new corroboration rule changes the corroboration 
analysis back to essentially the same analysis that military courts had 
conducted prior to the Adams decision.  Whether this interpretation of the 
new rule is what Congress intended is not entirely clear.  Congress clearly 
intended the new rule to overturn the holding in Adams; however, it is not 
clear if the intent to make the new rule conform with federal practice also 
evinced an intent for additional changes to the rule. 
 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Latour, 75 M.J. 723, 732–33 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2016) 
(applying the corroboration rule after Adams in a sexual assault case and upholding the trial 
court’s suppression of the accused’s admission to penetration where the act of penetration was 
not corroborated). 
8. See Brown, 617 F.3d at 862 (“It is one thing to state the corroboration rule (and the 
purposes it serves) and another to apply it.”); Major Russell L. Miller, Wrestling with MRE 
304(G): The Struggle to Apply the Corroboration Rule, 178 MIL. L. REV. 1, 47 (2003) (“[W]hile 
the rule seems straightforward, its application to a particular set of facts in a case may be 
difficult.”); Colonel J. Wesley Moore, The Corroboration Quandary: A Historical Overview of 
the Interpretation of MRE 304(g), 67 A.F. L. REV. 89, 89 (2011).  Moore reasons that although 
one might suppose that the rule is “well-settled and easily-applied,” it is not the case.  Id. at 91.  
“[O]ne facing a corroboration issue residing near the lower limit faces a task in many respects 
no less daunting than it was immediately after adoption of the Opper rule.”  Id. at 130. 
9. See Miller, supra note 8; Moore, supra note 8, at 91, 130; Zeigel W. Neff, 
Corroboration of a Confession in the Military, 16 JAG J. 19, 19 (1962) (“The early cases handed 
down by the Court of Military Appeals were somewhat conflicting, covering a wide range from 
a strict rule of corroboration to practically no requirement therefor at all. . . .  [C]orroboration is 
often not well understood by those practicing military law . . . .”); Major James B. Thwing, Eye 
of the Maelstrom: Pretrial Preparation of Child Abuse Cases, Part II, 6 ARMY LAW. 46, 58 
(June 1985) (“Many trial counsel and military judges are becoming increasingly confused about 
the meaning of Military Rule of Evidence 304(g), which governs the corroboration of 
confessions and admissions.”). 
10. United States v. Adams, 74 M.J. 137, 139–41 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
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Part I of this Article discusses the origins, purpose, and development 
of the corroboration rule.  Part II discusses the development of the rule in 
military courts up until the Adams decision.  Part III contextualizes the 
development of the new MRE 304(c), explains what has changed in the 
text of the rule, and discusses resources for interpreting it.  Part IV 
analyzes the new corroboration rule to determine what it means and how 
the rule has changed.  Finally, Part V concludes with a review of the new 
corroboration rule and whether it meets Congress’s intent in directing the 
rule. 
I. ORIGIN, PURPOSE, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORROBORATION 
RULE 
This section begins by describing the evolution of the corroboration 
rule from its origins as the corpus delicti rule in English common law to 
its broad acceptance in American criminal jurisprudence.  Next, this 
section details the varied rationales for having a requirement that 
confessions and admissions be corroborated by independent evidence.  
Finally, this section will discuss the development of the Modern 
corroboration rule by the Supreme Court. 
A. Corpus Delicti 
The modern corroboration rule traces its origin to the corpus delicti 
rule, which was a creation of seventeenth century English common law.  
The rule required independent evidence, apart from a confession, that a 
crime had actually occurred in order to convict someone who had 
confessed to the crime.11  The traditional example used to explain the 
origins of the corpus delicti rule is Perry’s Case, decided in 1660.12  There, 
the suspect, Perry, confessed to murdering his master, William Harrison, 
after Harrison disappeared.  In his confession, Perry implicated his mother 
and brother as participating in the murder.13  Harrison’s body was not 
found.14  Two years after all three were convicted and executed, Harrison 
showed up alive and well with an unbelievable story of how he was 
kidnapped in rural England, sold into slavery in Turkey, and escaped 
slavery as a stowaway on a ship before making his way to back to 
 
11. See Thomas A. Mullen, Rule Without Reason: Requiring Independent Proof of the 
Corpus Delicti as a Condition of Admitting an Extrajudicial Confession, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 385, 
385, 399–400 (1993).  For example, in a murder case, a confession to murder would be 
insufficient without some other evidence, such as a body.  See id. at 400–01, 401 n.76. 
12. 14 Howell St. Tr. 1312 (1660). 
13. See id. at 1315. 
14. See id. at 1318. 
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England.15  In the United States, there is a similar story: in 1812, a man 
who was convicted of murdering his missing brother-in-law based solely 
on his confession and, just days before his execution was scheduled, the 
brother-in-law was found alive in another state living under an assumed 
name.16  After this case, the corpus delicti rule, the precursor to the modern 
corroboration rule, took hold in the United States, and by the mid-
nineteenth century, nearly every jurisdiction had adopted some version of 
a corroboration requirement for confessions to all crimes.17 
B. Purpose of the Corroboration Rule 
Despite its long history, the corroboration rule is not constitutionally 
required, and its existence has been frequently questioned.18  There is no 
agreement among courts or commentators about what role the rule is 
supposed to play in the criminal justice system.19  The traditional 
justification is that it exists to prevent “errors in convictions based upon 
untrue confessions alone.”20  This justification stems from a general 
distrust of confessions in American criminal law.21  Judges’ experience 
show them that false confessions or admissions are alarmingly common, 
however, jurors do not have the same experience and tend to place too 
great of emphasis on confessions and admissions.22 
Three other commonly given justifications for requiring 
corroboration are: (1) protecting a person who confesses to a crime that 
he or she did not commit or that did not occur due to psychological or 
 
15. See id. at 1313, 1319–22. 
16. See generally The Trial of Stephen and Jesse Boorn, 6 AM. ST. TR. 73 (1819); see also 
David. A. Moran, In Defense of the Corpus Delicti Rule, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 817, 829–31 (2003) 
(recounting the facts of the Boorn case). 
17. See Mullen, supra note 11, at 401; see also Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde 
the Defendant’s Confession, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 638, 640 (1955) [hereinafter Proof] (explaining 
that the rule in England had been restricted to murder and bigamy, while in the United States, 
the rule applies to nearly all crimes). 
18. See United States v. Brown, 617 F.3d 857, 860–62 (6th Cir. 2010); Mullen, supra note 
11, at 418. 
19. Proof, supra note 17, at 642 (“The courts seldom have articulated a rationale for the 
corpus delicti rule . . . .  [T]he courts usually base their results on the great weight of judicial 
authority in support of the rule, rather than on an independent rationale.”). 
20. Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 347 (1941). 
21. See Corey J. Ayling, Comment, Corroborating Confessions: An Empirical Analysis 
of Legal Safeguards Against False Confessions, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (1984). 
22. See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954) (stating that the courts, the 
police, and the medical professions all have a number of experiences dealing with false 
confessions but that jurors tend not to have the same experience). 
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mental issues;23 (2) protecting individuals against confessions obtained 
through coercion, especially where the individual may be unable to 
establish the involuntary nature of the statement;24 and (3) promoting 
better law enforcement practices by requiring law enforcement to 
investigate and collect evidence rather than rely on confessions.25  The 
corroboration requirement also serves to protect a person who falsely 
confesses because of (1) a mistaken belief as to the facts or the law;26 (2) 
a hope of receiving a lighter sentence when faced with what they believe 
is “overwhelming circumstantial evidence;”27 (3) a fear of vigilante justice 
if released;28 or (4) a desire to protect another person.29  The rule also 
ensures that, after a confession has been obtained, the burden is on the 
government to present evidence and not on the accused to explain his or 
her innocence.30 
Despite all of these justifications and benefits of having the 
corroboration requirement, some courts and commentators have 
questioned whether there should be a corroboration rule at all, especially 
with the developments regarding self-incrimination that have arisen since 
the 1950s, such as Miranda v. Arizona.31  Ultimately, the long history of 
 
23. Mullen, supra note 11, at 401–03.  There are several aspects to this.  The first is that 
some people are mentally unstable and confess to imaginary crimes.  Id. at 402–03.  The second 
is that some people confess to crimes that did occur because they feel guilty about it or because 
they are seeking “punishment or notoriety.”  Id. at 402. 
24. Mullen, supra note 11, at 401, 404–05; see Smith, 348 U.S. at 153; Ayling, supra note 
21, at 1129. 
25. Mullen, supra note 11, at 401, 405–06; see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488–
89 (1964) (citations omitted) (“[A] system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend 
on the ‘confession’ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system 
which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.”); 
Smith, 348 U.S. at 153; Ayling, supra note 21, at 1128–29. 
26. Proof, supra note 17, at 643–44. 
27. See id. at 642-43. 
28. Id. at 643. 
29. See United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 354 (2d Cir. 1999). 
30. Ayling, supra note 21, at 1129.  
31. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring that, in a custodial interrogation, a person be 
informed of the right to remain silent, of the right to the presence of an attorney, and that any 
statement may be used as evidence against him or her).  Compare Mullen, supra note 11, at 399 
(arguing that the recent developments in the law undercut the rationale for its continued 
existence), and United States v. Brown, 617 F.3d. 857, 860–62 (6th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that 
the continued existence of the rule should be reassessed in light of developments in the law 
regarding confessions and admissions), with Moran, supra note 16, at 817 (arguing that the 
corroboration rule still serves an important purpose despite changes in the law), and Bryce, 208 
F.3d at 354–55 (justifying the role that the corroboration rule plays). 
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corroboration as part of American criminal law may be the best rationale 
for the rule’s continuing existence.32 
C. Development of the Corroboration Rule 
The modern corroboration rule was created by the Supreme Court in 
two cases decided on the same day in 1954: Opper v. United States33 and 
Smith v. United States.34  Before these cases, two competing corroboration 
rules existed in federal courts, and the Supreme Court sought to resolve 
the circuit split.35  Instead of adopting either of the existing rules, the Court 
formulated its own corroboration rule.36  The Court announced the rule in 
Opper, explaining that: 
It is necessary, therefore, to require the Government to introduce 
substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the 
trustworthiness of the statement.  Thus, the independent evidence 
serves a dual function.  It tends to make the admission reliable, thus 
corroborating it while also establishing independently the other 
necessary elements of the offense.  It is sufficient if the corroboration 
supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury 
inference of their truth.  Those facts plus the other evidence besides 
the admission must, of course, be sufficient to find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.37 
The Court did not explain what the operative phrase, “tend to establish the 
trustworthiness of [a] statement,” meant, nor did the Court define what 
constitutes an “essential fact.” 
In Smith, the Court added that “[a]ll elements of the offense must be 
established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one 
available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster 
the confession itself and thereby prove the offense ‘through’ the 
statements of the accused.”38  The corroboration does not have to 
 
32. See Mullen, supra note 11, at 406–07; see also Daeche v. United States, 250 F. 566, 
571 (2d Cir. 1918) (citation omitted) (“That the rule has in fact any substantial necessity in 
justice, we are much disposed to doubt . . . .  But we should not feel at liberty to disregard a 
principle so commonly accepted . . . .”). 
33. 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954). 
34. 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954). 
35. See Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (requiring corroborating 
evidence to corroborate the corpus delicti); Daeche, 250 F. at 571 (requiring only corroboration 
of the circumstances and not requiring corroboration of the corpus delicti); see also Opper, 348 
U.S. at 92–93 (explaining the two competing rules). 
36. See Opper, 348 U.S. at 92–93. 
37. Id. at 93 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
38. Smith, 348 U.S. at 156. 
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independently establish the crime; “it is sufficient if the corroboration 
merely fortifies the truth of the confession.”39  In a footnote, the Court 
noted that “[a]dmissions given under special circumstances, providing 
grounds for a strong inference of reliability, may not have to be 
corroborated.”40  These two cases formed the foundation for the 
corroboration rule in military courts. 
II. THE SWINGING PENDULUM: CORROBORATION IN MILITARY 
COURTS 
The application of the corroboration rule in the military has been far 
from consistent and marked by swings back and forth between extremes.  
The first part of this section begins with the origins of the corroboration 
rule in military courts before Opper and Smith and the impact of those 
cases on the military’s corroboration rule.  The next part of this section 
discusses the corroboration rule as codified in the Military Rules of 
Evidence and the courts’ struggles in interpreting and applying the rule 
prior to Adams.  Finally, this section concludes by discussing the decision 
in Adams and its interpretation of the corroboration rule. 
A. Corroboration Pre-MREs (1951–1980) 
Prior to Opper and Smith, the 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial 
(MCM) adopted the corpus delicti rule, which required evidence apart 
from the accused’s statement that the offense charged “had probably been 
committed by someone” in order for a confession or admission to be 
admissible.41  After Opper and Smith, the Court of Military Appeals 
considered the conflict between the corroboration rule announced in those 
cases and the rule in the 1951 MCM.  The Court of Military Appeals held 
that the rule from Opper and Smith did not apply to military courts and 
that the 1951 MCM rule remained the standard for corroboration in the 
military.42 
 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 155 n.3. 
41. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES MIL. R. EVID. 140(a) (1951). 
42. See United States v. Smith, 32 C.M.R. 105, 108–20 (C.M.A 1962) (holding, after a 
lengthy discussion, that the 1951 MCM corroboration rule applies to the military despite the 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Opper and Smith); United States v. Villasenor, 19 C.M.R. 129, 
131–33 (C.M.A 1955) (holding that the President has the authority to promulgate rules for 
military courts, so the 1951 MCM’s corroboration rule applies to military courts rather than the 
Supreme Court’s rule). 
 
2019] REDEFINING CORROBORATION 227 
 
The updated 1968 version of the MCM abandoned the 1951 MCM 
corroboration rule in favor of a rule based on Opper and Smith,43 and this 
rule was subsequently included in the 1969 version of the MCM.44  Rather 
than quote the language from Opper, the 1968 MCM created a rule based 
on the Opper decision that attempted to explain what the corroboration 
rule from Opper required.  The text of the MCM’s rule stated: 
It is a general rule that a confession or admission of the accused cannot 
be considered as evidence against him on the question of guilt or 
innocence unless independent evidence, either direct or circumstantial, 
has been introduced which corroborates the essential facts admitted 
sufficiently to justify an inference of their truth.45 
Notably, the rule did not include the trustworthiness of the statement as 
part of the standard for corroboration, as in Opper, but instead only that 
the “essential facts admitted” had been sufficiently corroborated.46  The 
rule also required that an essential fact in a statement had to be individually 
corroborated in order for the part of the accused’s statement regarding that 
essential fact to be admissible.47  The rule stated: 
If the independent evidence raises an inference of the truth of some, 
but not all, of the essential facts admitted, then the confession or 
admission may be considered as evidence against the accused only 
with respect to those essential facts stated in the confession or 
admission which are so corroborated by the independent evidence.48 
The word trustworthiness did not even appear in the 1968 MCM 
corroboration rule, the 1969 MCM corroboration rule, or in the drafters’ 
analysis of the rule.49  Although purporting to adopt the Supreme Court’s 
corroboration rule in Opper and Smith, the standard in the 1968 MCM and 
1969 MCM departed significantly from the Supreme Court’s rule by 
requiring corroboration of each essential fact in the statement in order for 
 
43. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES MIL. R. EVID. 140(a)(5) 
(1968) [hereinafter 1968 MCM]. 
44. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES MIL. R. EVID. 140(a)(5) 
(1969) [hereinafter 1969 MCM]; U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-2, ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1969, para. 140(a)(5) (July 28, 1970) 
[hereinafter DA PAM. 27-2]. 
45. See 1968 MCM, supra note 43 (emphasis added). 
46. See id.; 1969 MCM, supra note 44. 
47. See 1969 MCM, supra note 44; 1968 MCM, supra note 43. 
48. 1968 MCM, supra note 43. 
49. See 1969 MCM, supra note 44; 1968 MCM, supra note 43; DA PAM. 27-2, supra note 
44. 
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that essential fact to be admissible, rather than requiring that the statement 
alone be corroborated.50 
B. Military Rules of Evidence Corroboration Rule (1980–2015) 
The formulation of the corroboration rule provided in the 1969 MCM 
laid the foundation for the rule when the Military Rules of Evidence were 
adopted in 1980.  The corroboration requirement was codified as MRE 
304(g), which later became MRE 304(c).51  Like the 1969 MCM version, 
the MRE 304 corroboration rule required corroboration of the essential 
facts in the confession or admission and required individual corroboration 
of each essential fact in order for that part of the accused’s statement to be 
admissible.52  Once again, there was no reference to trustworthiness in 
either the text of the rule or in the drafters’ analysis of it.53 
Although the singular focus on corroborating the essential facts in the 
statement should have made the rule easy to apply, in practice the rule was 
still “prove[n] easier to state than to apply.”54  In part, this was due to 
military courts largely ignoring the requirement in the text of the rule that 
each essential fact must be individually corroborated and instead applying 
a purpose-based reading of the rule.55  Under the purpose-based reading, 
courts still required that the essential facts in the accused’s statement be 
corroborated, but focused on ensuring that corroboration of the essential 
facts made the statement, as a whole, trustworthy, rather than rigorously 
identifying the essential facts in the statement and ensuring that each 
essential fact was individually corroborated.56  However, this purpose-
 
50. See 1969 MCM, supra note 44; 1968 MCM, supra note 43.  By requiring each 
essential fact be corroborated individually, the 1968 and 1969 MCMs also rejected the holding 
in Smith that corroboration can “bolster the statement itself and thereby prove the offense 
‘through’ the statements of the accused.”  See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954). 
51. See Exec. Order No. 12,198, 45 Fed. Reg. 16,932, 16,945 (Mar. 12, 1980) (amending 
1969 MCM, supra note 44 and promulgating MRE 304(g)); Exec. Order No. 13,643, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 29,559, 29,563-64 (May 21, 2013) (revising 2012 MCM, supra note 6 and moving 
corroboration to 304(c)). 
52. See SUPPLEMENT TO MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES MIL. R. 
EVID. 304(c) (2012) [hereinafter 2012 MCM SUPPLEMENT]. 
53. See id.; 2012 MCM, supra note 6, app. 22 at A22-13 (analyzing 304(g)). 
54. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., 1 MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 304.02 
cmt. 5 (8th ed. 2015). 
55. See United States v. Adams, 74 M.J. 137, 143 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (Baker, C.J., 
dissenting) (explaining that the court has not previously adopted a literal reading of the 
corroboration rule because it would be unworkable and, in the present case, would be redundant 
with other evidence). 
56. See, e.g., id. at 142-43; United States v. Seay, 60 M.J. 73, 80 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (“[T]he 
[corroboration] rule simply requires a presence of facts that enable the members to infer the 
truth of the essential facts in the confession.”); United States v. Maio, 34 M.J. 215, 218–19 
(C.A.A.F. 1992) (finding the essential facts in the accused’s statement were sufficiently 
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based reading of the rule resulted in wildly inconsistent applications of the 
rule, leading one commentator to conclude that facing a question of 
corroboration over fifty years after Opper was “in many respects no less 
daunting than it was immediately after adoption of the Opper rule.”57  
Because of the difference between the text of the rule and the purpose-
based reading of it, between 1968 and 2015, military courts were said to 
be “riding a pendulum back and forth” between requiring an extremely 
high amount of corroboration and, conversely, requiring virtually no 
corroboration.58  In 2015, the C.A.A.F. sought to provide clarity in the 
Adams decision. 
C. United States v. Adams 
In United States v. Adams, the defendant, Specialist (SPC) Adams, 
confessed to stealing cocaine from a drug dealer named Ootz at gunpoint 
after one of his co-conspirators implicated him in the robbery.59  The only 
evidence presented by the government at trial, in addition to SPC Adams’s 
confession, was: (1) a handgun seized from SPC Adams’s house that was 
the same make and model as the one he said he used during the robbery; 
(2) testimony of two Criminal Investigation Division Special Agents that 
Timothy Ootz was a former soldier and known drug dealer; and (3) that 
the two locations where SPC Adams said the larceny occurred were near 
one another and close to post.60  Based on this evidence, SPC Adams was 
convicted of larceny at court-martial.61 
The C.A.A.F. overturned SPC Adams’s conviction and held that the 
corroboration rule meant what it said—that each essential fact must be 
individually corroborated and any essential fact that is not corroborated is 
inadmissible and must be removed from the accused’s statement.62  The 
C.A.A.F. went on to state that “[t]here is no ‘tipping point’ of 
corroboration which would allow admission of the entire confession if a 
certain percentage of essential facts are found to be corroborated.”63  For 
example, if the judge determines that a confession contains five essential 
facts, and if four of the essential facts are sufficiently corroborated, those 
 
corroborated without specifying what those facts were and without any direct evidence of the 
accused’s alleged drug). 
57. Moore, supra note 8, at 130. 
58. Adams, 74 M.J. at 141 (Baker, C.J., dissenting). 
59. See id. at 138.  Ootz and the co-conspirators did not testify at trial.  See id. 
60. See id. at 138, 141. 
61. See id. at 138. 
62. See id. at 140–41. 
63. Id. at 140. 
 
230 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:219 
four essential facts are admissible, but the fifth, uncorroborated essential 
fact is not admissible and must be excised from the statement.64  The 
C.A.A.F. concluded there was no corroboration of the act of larceny.65  
Therefore, the part of SPC Adams’s statement regarding taking the 
cocaine from Ootz was inadmissible because it was not corroborated and 
should have been excised from the statement.66  Without that part of his 
statement, there was no admissible evidence that a crime of larceny had 
even occurred. 
Chief Judge Baker dissented, joined by Judge Ryan.67  He concluded 
that the majority’s formulation of the rule was unworkable and would 
prevent the government from “using the confession to fill in essential facts 
that might not otherwise be known to the government.”68  He stated that 
“because the only essential fact in [Adams’s] statement that is not 
demonstrated by independent evidence is the actual theft of the cocaine, 
the Court’s decision effectively returns the law to a corpus del[i]cti test.”69  
The difference between the majority and the dissenting opinions comes 
down to taking a textualist reading of the rule (the majority) or a purpose-
based reading of the rule (the dissent). 
III. THE NEW MRE 304(C) CORROBORATION RULE 
Almost immediately after Adams was decided, the process was 
underway to overturn it.  The first part of this section explains the 
amendment process.  In the next two parts, this section compares the old 
corroboration rule with the amendments and explains what changes were 
made to the rule.  Then this section concludes by discussing several 
sources that can be used to help interpret the new corroboration rule. 
A. The Amendment Process 
Within weeks of the C.A.A.F.’s decision in Adams, the military 
sexual assault advocacy group, Protect Our Defenders, submitted 
proposed changes to MRE 304(c) to Senator Kirsten Gillibrand.70  The 
holding in Adams had the potential for having a far-reaching impact, 
 
64. See id. at 140–41. 
65. See id. at 141. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. (Baker, C.J., dissenting). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 141–42. 
70. See PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS, POD 2015–2016 POLICY PRIORITIES 2–3, 
http://protectourdefenders.com/downloads/POD_Policy_Priorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/526N-
GJE3]. 
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notably on the military’s ability to prosecute sexual assault cases.71  
Twenty-two days after Adams was decided, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee included a provision in the FY16 NDAA directing specific 
textual changes be made to MRE 304(c).72  A different provision was 
ultimately included in the FY16 NDAA, which did not direct specific 
changes to the rule, but instead stated: “To the extent the President 
considers practicable, the President shall modify Rule 304(c) of the 
Military Rules of Evidence to conform to the rules governing the 
admissibility of the corroboration of admissions and confessions in the 
trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.”73  On May 20, 
2016, the President promulgated the new MRE 304(c) which made all of 
the changes to the rule initially proposed in the Senate.74 
B. Comparing the Old and New Versions of MRE 304(c) 
The amendment to MRE 304(c) changed the corroboration rule in two 
significant respects.  First, it removed the requirement that each essential 
fact had to be individually corroborated in order to be admissible.75  The 
new rule replaced it with a provision explicitly stating the opposite.76  The 
new rule has a tipping point and once there is sufficient corroboration, the 
entire statement is admissible.77  Second, the new MRE 304(c) changes 
the standard of corroboration.  The standard is no longer corroborating the 
“essential facts admitted” in the statement.78  Instead, the new standard is 
that a confession or admission is admissible if independent evidence “has 
been admitted into evidence that would tend to establish the 
trustworthiness of the admission or confession.”79  The drafters’ analysis 
 
71. See, e.g., United States v. Latour, 75 M.J. 723, 731–33 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2016) 
(applying the holding in Adams to uphold the trial judge’s exclusion of the accused’s admission 
regarding sexual assault because the admissions were insufficiently corroborated). 
72. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, S. 1376, 114th Cong. 
§ 546 (as reported by S. Comm. on Armed Servs., May 19, 2015). 
73. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 545, 
129 Stat. 726, 820 (2015). 
74. See Order 13,730, supra note 1, at 487–88 (amending MRE 304(c)); National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, S. 1376, 114th Cong. § 546 (as reported by S. Comm. 
on Armed Servs., May 19, 2015). 
75. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, MIL. R. EVID. 304(c)(1) 
(2016) [hereinafter 2016 MCM]; see also infra app. C. 
76. 2016 MCM, supra note 75 (“ Not every element or fact contained in the confession or 
admission must be independently proven for the confession or admission to be admitted into 
evidence in its entirety.”). 
77. See id. 
78. Compare 2012 MCM SUPPLEMENT, supra note 52, with 2016 MCM, supra note 75. 
79. 2016 MCM, supra note 75. 
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of the rule states that the change “brings military practice in line with 
federal practice” and cites to Opper and Smith.80  Much like 
trustworthiness did not appear anywhere in the old rule, the phrase 
“essential facts” similarly does not appear in the text of the new rule and 
the drafters’ analysis of it. 
C. Does the New MRE 304(c) Do More than Overrule Adams? 
In analyzing the scope of the changes to MRE 304(c), the basic 
question is whether the changes alter the corroboration analysis to the 
minimum extent necessary to overrule Adams, and return the 
corroboration analysis to what it had been prior to Adams, or whether the 
changes represent a more significant change to the corroboration analysis.  
As a threshold matter, the two changes to MRE 304(c) are related to one 
another.  The introduction of a tipping point necessarily requires the focus 
to be on the statement itself rather than on each essential fact contained in 
it.  Therefore, to overrule Adams, it was necessary to change the standard 
to one focused on corroborating the statement as a whole. 
Despite the necessity of changing the standard in order to overturn 
Adams, the object of corroboration in the new rule is nevertheless different 
than the object of corroboration under the old rule.  Under the old 
corroboration rule, the essential facts contained in the statement were 
being corroborated,81 whereas under the new rule the statement itself is 
being corroborated.82  The removal of essential facts from the rule could 
indicate a repudiation of corroborating the essential facts in the 
statement.83  Additionally, the intent of the new MRE 304(c) was to bring 
it in line with Opper, Smith, and federal practice, which suggests a broader 
intent to overhaul the rule beyond just overturning Adams.84  Therefore, 
to evaluate the scope of the changes to MRE 304(c), it is necessary to 
consider all of the potential ways of interpreting it. 
 
80. Id. app. 22 at A22-12. 
81. See United States v. Adams, 74 M.J. 137, 140–41 (C.A.A.F. 2015); 2012 MCM 
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 52. 
82. 2016 MCM, supra note 75. 
83. See United States v. Matthews, 68 M.J. 29, 37 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (“When Congress acts 
to amend a statute, [courts] presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial 
effect.” (quoting Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995))).  In 
Opper, corroborating essential facts was one way to corroborate a statement but not necessarily 
the only way.  See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954); see also Smith v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 147, 155 n.3, 156 (1954) (providing two other ways of corroborating a 
statement). 
84. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, 
§ 545, 129 Stat. 726, 820 (2015); 2016 MCM, supra note 75, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c), app. 22 
at A22-12.  In fact, Adams is not even cited as a reason for amending the rule. 
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D. Interpreting the New Trustworthiness Standard of Corroboration 
Determining how expansive the changes in the new MRE 304(c) are 
requires examining the plain meaning of the rule, the intent behind it to 
follow federal practice, and the context provided by prior military case 
law in which the changes were made.  These sources will each be briefly 
introduced before being used in Section IV of this Article to interpret the 
new MRE 304(c). 
1. Plain Meaning 
The rules of statutory construction apply to the MREs and the MREs 
are usually construed in accordance with their plain or ordinary meaning.85  
The dictionary definition of the word “trustworthy” is “worthy of trust; 
dependable; reliable.”86  Although this generic definition is of little use, 
when language in a rule or statute has a common law meaning or has been 
judicially interpreted, that meaning usually applies rather than the plain 
meaning of the words.87  Because “tend to establish the trustworthiness” 
is taken from Opper,88 the federal courts have had over sixty years to 
interpret what it means.  Therefore, plain meaning suggests looking to 
federal practice to determine the meaning of the phrase “tend to establish 
the trustworthiness” as used in MRE 304(c). 
2. Corroboration in Federal Courts After Opper and Smith 
The corroboration rule in federal courts is potentially the most helpful 
source for interpreting the new standard of corroboration.  First, the plain 
meaning analysis directs one to federal practice given the significant 
experience of federal courts in interpreting the same phrase.89  Second, 
Congress’s intent in directing the President to amend MRE 304(c) was 
 
85. See United States v. Custis, 65 M.J. 366, 370 (C.A.A.F. 2007).  This is ordinarily done 
by reference to a dictionary.  See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:28 (7th ed. rev. vol. 2014) (“[U]nless otherwise defined, 
words are interpreted to take their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning in the absence of 
persuasive reasons to the contrary.”); see, e.g., Matthews, 68 M.J. at 36–37 (using dictionaries 
to determine the meaning of the word “courts” within the MREs). 
86. Trustworthy, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1436 (3d College ed. 1988).  
Trust is similarly defined as a “firm belief or confidence in the honesty, integrity, reliability, 
justice, etc. of another person or thing.”  Id. 
87. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 85, § 47:30. 
88. Opper, 348 U.S. at 93. 
89. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 85, § 47:30 (stating that when legal language is 
adopted from another jurisdiction, the construction of that language within that jurisdiction is 
also adopted). 
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that it conform to the corroboration rule in federal practice.90  Third, the 
drafters’ analysis accompanying the new MRE 304(c) states that their 
intent was to “bring[] military practice in line with federal practice” and 
cites Opper and Smith as the authorities for federal practice.91  Therefore, 
federal practice is particularly relevant as a source for interpreting the new 
MRE 304(c). 
The Supreme Court has not substantively altered the corroboration 
rule since Opper and Smith.92  Unlike the MREs, there is no corroboration 
rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence.93  Because of this, the federal courts 
of appeals have had the opportunity to interpret and apply Opper and 
Smith independently since 1954.  As a result, different variations of the 
corroboration rule have developed, and there are differences regarding 
almost every aspect of corroboration, including: instances when 
corroboration is required,94 how much corroboration is required,95 what 
must be corroborated,96 and the relationship that the corroboration must 
have with the statement.97 
 
90. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, 
§ 545, 129 Stat. 726, 820 (2015). 
91. See 2016 MCM, supra note 75, app. 22 at A22-12. 
92. The only case to consider corroboration in any depth was Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 488–91, 489 n.15 (1963). 
93. See 2016 MCM, supra note 75, app. 22 at A22-5 (stating that, among others, MRE 
304 has no equivalent in the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
94. See United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 355 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring some 
statements to be made contemporaneously with the offense being corroborated); United States 
v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 536–37 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that admissions before or during the 
commission of a crime do not require corroboration); United States v. O’Connell, 703 F.2d 645, 
647 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing a circuit split regarding whether all confessions or admissions 
must be corroborated or only those made to law enforcement after the crime). 
95. Compare United States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894, 905 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that the 
corroboration “hurdle is low”), with Yarbrough v. United States, 309 F.2d 936, 937–38 (10th 
Cir. 1962) (requiring a lot of corroborating evidence). 
96. See United States v. Kirk, 528 F.3d 1102, 1112 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Corroborative facts 
may be of any kind, so long as they tend to produce confidence in the truth of the confession.”).  
In Kirk, the court also considered the detailed nature of the admission, the voluntariness of it, 
and its reasonableness.  Id.; see also Bryce, 208 F.3d at 354–55 (allowing corroboration based 
upon content of the statement, the context in which it was given, and the nature of the statement 
itself); United States v. Calhoun, No. 92-2011, 1993 WL 280324, at *3 (6th Cir. July 26, 1993) 
(per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (stating that the essential facts must be corroborated). 
97. Compare United States v. Stephens, 482 F.3d 669, 673 (4th Cir. 2007) (requiring 
corroboration of the connection between co-conspirators in a conspiracy rather than just 
corroboration of the statement), and Calhoun, 1993 WL 280324 at *3 (requiring separate 
corroboration for each crime charged rather than for the statement itself), with United States v. 
Brown, 617 F.3d 857, 863–64 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that corroboration of part of a statement 
can corroborate the entire statement), and United States v. Sterling, 555 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 
2009) (stating that corroboration of some crimes in a statement can corroborate other crimes in 
the statement). 
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3. Prior Military Case Law 
Military case law regarding the old corroboration rule should not be 
ignored in interpreting the new rule.  Prior to Adams, military courts 
largely ignored the strict requirement in the text of the rule that each 
essential fact had to be independently corroborated on a one-for-one basis 
in favor of a purpose-based reading.98  However, military courts still 
required that at least some essential facts in the statement had to be 
corroborated.99  There is a risk of giving prior military case law too much 
weight in interpreting the new MRE 304(c) because those cases were 
applying a corroboration rule whose text required that the essential facts 
be corroborated whereas the text of the new rule no longer has that 
requirement.  Therefore, although prior military case law should not be 
completely ignored, it should be approached cautiously as a tool for 
determining the scope of the changes to MRE 304(c).100 
IV. DECIPHERING THE MEANING OF “TEND TO ESTABLISH THE 
TRUSTWORTHINESS” 
Understanding the meaning of “tend to establish the trustworthiness” 
in the new corroboration rule is the key to understanding the meaning of 
the new rule.  To that end, this section attempts to elucidate what is being 
corroborated, how what is being corroborated must relate to what is doing 
the corroboration, and what constitutes sufficient corroboration.  After 
that analysis, this section concludes that the best interpretation of the new 
corroboration rule is that it constitutes a return to the old essential fact 
analysis prior to Adams. 
A. Possible Impacts of a New Standard 
Beyond overturning the requirement that each essential fact in a 
statement be individually corroborated, the new MRE 304(c) 
corroboration standard potentially impacts or changes the corroboration 
standard in three areas.  These areas are: (1) what must be corroborated, 
 
98. See, e.g., United States v. Seay, 60 M.J. 73, 80 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (finding sufficient 
corroboration for larceny of a wallet from a murder victim despite no wallet being found and no 
evidence of larceny besides the accused’s confession); United States v. Maio, 34 M.J. 215, 218 
(C.M.A. 1992) (finding sufficient corroboration for drug use without direct evidence of use); 
see also United States v. Adams, 74 M.J. 137, 142–43 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (Baker, C.J., dissenting) 
(stating that the Court has applied a purpose-based reading of the rule in prior cases). 
99. E.g., Seay, 60 M.J. at 80 (finding sufficient corroboration for larceny based on the 
surrounding circumstances being corroborated despite there being no corroboration of the act 
of larceny itself). 
100. However, if the new MRE 304(c) is interpreted to still require that facts in the 
statement be corroborated, then prior military case law is relevant and largely applicable. 
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(2) what relationship the corroborating evidence must have with the 
statement, and (3) how much evidence is necessary to corroborate a 
statement. 
1. What Must be Corroborated? 
“[T]end to establish the trustworthiness of the admission or 
confession” makes the object of corroboration the admission or confession 
itself, not the essential facts contained in the statement as under the old 
rule.101  The purpose of corroboration is to show that the statement itself 
is trustworthy rather than to show that the essential facts in the statement 
are true.  Under the old MRE 304(c) corroboration rule, the object of 
corroboration was limited to the essential facts in the statement, and the 
essential fact analysis was focused on the substantive content of the 
statement.  Specifically, it focused on one particular type of content in the 
statement—those facts that were determined by a military judge to be 
essential.  However, introducing evidence that supports the truth of facts 
in the statement is not necessarily the only way to show that a statement 
is trustworthy.102 
In federal courts, three methods of corroborating an accused’s 
statement have been recognized, although not all federal courts have 
endorsed all three methods.103  The three methods of corroborating a 
statement are: (1) corroborating facts in the statement,104 (2) corroborating 
the circumstances in which the statement was made,105 and (3) showing 
that the internal character of the statement makes the statement reliable.106 
 
101. 2016 MCM, supra note 75 (emphasis added). 
102. A statement could be considered trustworthy for reasons other than corroborating 
facts in the statement, such as: who made the statement, the circumstances in which the 
statement was made, the believability of the statement, the amount of detail in the statement, 
the motivations of the person making the statement, and whether the person has a history of 
making truthful statements.  See United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1110–11 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(listing factors for determining trustworthiness regarding the residual hearsay exception). 
103. Compare United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 355–56 (2d Cir. 1999) (allowing all 
three types of corroboration), with United States v. Todd, 657 F.2d 212, 216 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(allowing only one type of corroboration: corroborating facts in the statement). 
104. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 363 F.3d 815, 819 (8th Cir. 2004) (listing 
evidence introduced at trial that corroborated facts in the defendant’s statement); United States 
v. Howard, 179 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 1999) (corroborating a statement by corroborating facts 
in the statement). 
105. See, e.g., Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355 (“A defendant’s statement made in a manner and in 
circumstances sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt needs no 
corroboration.”); United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 940 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
voluntary statements which were not made during interrogation required less corroboration). 
106. See, e.g., Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355–56; United States v. Gresham, 585 F.2d 103, 106 
(5th Cir. 1978) (stating that corroboration can come from the “detailed nature of the confession 
itself”). 
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Corroborating the facts in the statement is the most common way that 
federal courts corroborate statements.107  That is, the statement contains 
factual assertions and other evidence in the case verifies, supports, or is 
consistent with those factual assertions.108  A basic example of this type 
of corroboration would be Doe makes a statement that he punched Roe 
and that statement is corroborated by Roe saying Doe punched him and 
Roe having a black eye.  All federal courts accept corroborating the facts 
in the statement as a way to corroborate the statement itself.109 
Some federal courts have also considered the circumstances or 
context in which a statement was made in evaluating whether it is 
trustworthy.110  In determining if a statement is trustworthy, these courts 
will consider factors such as: to whom the statement was made, why it 
was made, when it was made, and whether it was made voluntarily.111  
Under the context view, the trustworthiness of the admission can be 
derived, at least in part, from surrounding circumstances that suggest the 
statement is reliable.112  For example, suppose Doe sexually assaulted Roe 
 
107. See, e.g., United States v. Cavillo-Rojas, 510 F. App’x 238, 244–55 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(finding corroboration insufficient by only considering facts in the statement); Yarbrough v. 
United States, 309 F.2d 936, 937–38 (10th Cir. 1962) (finding insufficient corroboration by only 
considering evidence introduced at trial). 
108. See United States v. Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2000). 
109. When determining whether a statement is adequately corroborated, the Supreme 
Court has consistently looked to whether the independent evidence in the case corroborated the 
facts in the statement.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488–91 (1963) (finding 
that a co-conspirator’s after-the-fact written confession was not admissible as corroboration and, 
as a result, there was insufficient corroboration); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 164–
69 (1954) (finding sufficient corroboration of tax evasion with bank records and tax records); 
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 157–59 (1954) (finding sufficient corroboration of tax 
evasion with documents and testimony regarding the Defendant’s net worth); Opper v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 84, 93–94 (1954) (finding sufficient corroboration for bribery based on 
circumstantial evidence). 
110. See Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355; see also Calderon, 348 U.S. at 163–64. 
111. See United States v. Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d 906, 925 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding 
statement inherently reliable because it was voluntarily made after being advised of his rights 
under Miranda); United States v. Falls, 543 F. App’x 54, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) 
(finding telephone call by the Defendant was self-corroborating because it was made to his 
brother and would have risked his own life and his brother’s life if he were lying); United States 
v. Krikheli, 461 F. App’x 7, 9 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (finding that corroboration was 
not necessary because the statements were made in furtherance of a conspiracy to a person the 
Defendant believed was a co-conspirator); United States v. Kirk, 528 F.3d 1102, 1112 (8th Cir. 
2008) (corroborating a statement, in part, because it was voluntary); Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355 
(finding insufficient corroboration, but taking into consideration the fact that the statements 
were made on a wiretapped phone while negotiating a drug deal). 
112. See Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d at 925; Falls, 543 F. App’x at 57–58; Kirk, 528 F.3d at 
1112; see also Calderon, 348 U.S. at 163–64 (finding that circumstances can also require more 
corroboration).  Many of the hearsay exceptions are also justified for this same reason—that the 
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when Roe was asleep and the next morning, before any law enforcement 
involvement, Doe sends an unprompted text message to Roe apologizing 
for sexually assaulting Roe while Roe was asleep the previous night.  Most 
courts have either failed to address this type of corroboration or have 
limited corroboration to facts in the statement.113 
A few courts will also consider the internal character of the statement 
itself in determining if the statement is trustworthy, such as: the amount 
of detail in the statement, the complexity of the statement, the internal 
coherence of the statement, and the plausibility of the statement.114  
Usually, these factors supplement other evidence which corroborates facts 
in the statement.115  An example of this type of corroboration would be a 
detailed, logical, and coherent ten-page written statement by Doe 
confessing to punching Roe and explaining how he knows Roe, why he 
punched Roe, and the circumstances surrounding punching Roe. 
Although there are three methods in federal practice to corroborate a 
statement, the text of MRE 304(c) limits the methods of corroboration 
available in military courts.  Self-corroboration—corroboration based on 
 
circumstances in which a statement is made can make it more reliable.  See, e.g., Bryan A. 
Liang, Shortcuts to “Truth”: The Legal Mythology of Dying Declarations, 35 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 229, 231–36 (1998). 
113. Only the Second Circuit has affirmatively embraced context in which a statement 
was made as a method of corroboration.  See Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355.  The Ninth Circuit has a 
two-part test and one of the parts can be proven by the context in which the statement was made, 
but the other part requires evidence that a crime occurred.  See Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d at 925; 
United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 592–93 (9th Cir. 1992).  Other circuits have used 
context to bolster corroboration of the facts in the statement, but the focus remains on 
corroborating facts.  See, e.g., Kirk, 528 F.3d at 1112; United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 
939–40 (7th Cir. 1988). 
114. See United States v. Sterling, 555 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States 
v. Gresham, 585 F.2d 103, 106 (5th Cir. 1978)) (stating that the detailed nature of a statement 
can be corroboration); Kirk, 528 F.3d at 1112 (considering the “elaborate” and detailed nature 
of the statement and that it that provides a “reasonable explanation” as part of the corroboration 
analysis); United States v. Varela-Garcia, 87 F. App’x 795, 798–99 (3rd Cir. 2004) (considering 
the detailed nature of the statement); United States v. Whittaker, 67 F. App’x 697, 701–02 (3rd 
Cir. 2003) (considering the detailed nature of the statement (citing Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 
F.2d 401, 410 (3rd Cir. 1991))); United States v. Wolf, 535 F.2d 476, 479 (8th Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam) (finding that the statement was a reasonable explanation). 
115. See, e.g., Sterling, 555 F.3d at 456–57 (finding that a statement confessing to drug 
trafficking and firearm offenses was adequately corroborated based on both the detailed nature 
of the statement as well as Defendant’s possession of firearms and possession of drugs); Kirk, 
528 F.3d at 1112 (finding a statement adequately corroborated based on the evidence offered at 
trial as well as the statement being detailed in a reasonable explanation about what happened).  
However, some courts have cited to a footnote in Smith that some statements do not require 
corroboration and are instead self-corroborating.  See Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355 (citing Smith, 348 
U.S. at 155 n.3).  Those courts state that, in some circumstances, the internal character of the 
statement may be such that no corroboration at all is required and a person can be convicted 
based upon his or her admissions or confession alone.  See id. 
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the internal character of the statement—is rejected by MRE 304(c) 
because the only method of corroboration the rule allows is for 
independent evidence to be “admitted into evidence”.116  Allowing a 
statement to be adequately corroborated based solely on the internal 
character of the statement is, by definition, corroboration without 
independent evidence. 
Just as clearly, the text of the new MRE 304(c) allows for 
corroborating a statement by corroborating facts in the statement.117  
Corroboration of sufficient facts in the statement makes the statement as 
a whole trustworthy and admissible.  Importantly, MRE 304(c) no longer 
limits corroboration to just those facts that the military judge determines 
to be essential facts.118  Rather, corroboration of any fact in the statement 
could be relevant in tending to establish the trustworthiness of the 
statement. 
Whether MRE 304(c) allows for the context in which the statement 
was made to be part of the corroboration analysis is less clear.  It is neither 
specifically prohibited nor specifically allowed by the text of the rule.  For 
several reasons, however, reading MRE 304(c) to allow for corroboration 
based upon the context in which the statement was given is a more tortured 
reading of the rule than limiting corroboration to only the facts contained 
in the statement.  First, MRE 304(c)(2) states that “[n]ot every element or 
fact contained in the confession or admission must be independently 
proven for the confession or admission to be admitted into evidence in its 
entirety.”119  This implies that at least some elements or facts must be 
corroborated.  Second, MRE 304(c)(4) states that “[t]he independent 
evidence necessary to establish corroboration need not be sufficient of 
itself to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of facts stated in the 
admission or confession.”120  This implies that the corroborating evidence 
will corroborate facts contained in the statement and need only raise an 
 
116. 2016 MCM, supra note 75.  Even though the rule purports to follow Opper and 
Smith, it specifically rejects one type of corroboration endorsed by Smith.  Because 
corroboration is inherently case specific, the internal character of a statement may still be 
relevant in determining whether the facts corroborated sufficiently relate to the statement as a 
whole in order to corroborate it.  Once a statement is admitted, the character of it is relevant to 
the trier of fact in determining how much weight to give it.  See id. at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c). 
117. See id. at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c)(2). 
118. See id. at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c); 2012 MCM, supra note 7, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(g) 
(repealed 2014). 
119. 2016 MCM, supra note 73, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c)(2). 
120. Id. at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c)(4). 
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inference of their truth.121  Therefore, although the text is more consistent 
with not permitting corroboration based upon context, it does not prohibit 
it, so it is necessary to examine the intent behind the new rule. 
The intent behind the new MRE 304(c) to follow federal practice 
provides limited help in determining if the rule allows for corroboration 
of the context in which the statement was made because some federal 
courts allow it and some do not.122  However, the majority of courts have 
either not discussed using context to corroborate or limited the 
corroboration analysis to only consider corroborating facts contained in 
the statement.123  Military courts prior to Adams also limited corroboration 
to corroborating facts in the statement.124  Although not conclusive, the 
text of the rule is more consistent with limiting corroboration to the facts 
in the statement and this limitation is also consistent with how the majority 
of federal courts corroborate statements and with prior military case law.  
Therefore, although interpreting the new MRE 304(c) to allow for 
corroboration based upon the context in which the statement was made 
does not violate the text of the rule, it is a strained reading of it.125 
 
121. See id. (stating that the corroborating evidence “need raise only an inference of the 
truth” of the statement). 
122. Compare United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 355 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A defendant’s 
statement made in a manner and in circumstances sufficient to support a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt needs no corroboration.”), with United States v. Calhoun, No. 92-2011, 1993 
WL 280324, at *3 (6th Cir. July 26, 1993) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (“[T]he 
law in this Circuit requires that the essential facts in an admission or a confession be 
corroborated.”).  Before the President promulgated the new MRE 304(c), one commentator 
proposed a slightly different formulation of a new MRE 304(c) along with a more substantial 
drafter’s analysis that embraced corroboration based upon context as well as content.  See Major 
Brittany Warren, A Proposal to Amend Military Rule of Evidence 304 to Conform with Federal 
Practice, 4 ARMY LAW. 25, 28 (2016).  A drafter’s analysis similar to the one Warren proposed 
would likely tip the balance in favor of allowing corroboration based on context. 
123. Compare United States v. Stephens, 482 F.3d 669, 672–73 (4th Cir. 2007) (not 
discussing corroboration by context), and United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 591–
92 (9th Cir. 1992) (vaguely explaining corroboration without stating if context can be used), 
with Calhoun, 1993 WL 280324, at *3 (limiting corroboration to only essential facts in the 
statement), and United States v. Todd, 657 F.2d 212, 216 (8th Cir. 1981) (requiring 
corroboration of the essential elements of the charged crime). 
124. See United States v. McClain, 71 M.J. 80, 81–82 (C.A.A.F. 2012); United States v. 
Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154, 160 (C.A.A.F. 2008); United States v. Baldwin, 54 M.J. 464, 465–66 
(C.A.A.F. 2001); United States v. Cottrill, 45 M.J. 485, 489 (C.A.A.F. 1997).  The limitation of 
corroborating a statement by corroborating facts in the statement is likely the result of the 
requirement in the text of the rule that the essential facts be corroborated.  2012 MCM, supra 
note 6, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(g). 
125. The dissent in Adams states that military courts prior to Adams have “heretofore 
applied a purpose-based reading of the rule that tests for trustworthiness.”  United States v. 
Adams, 74 M.J. 137, 143 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (Baker, C.J., dissenting).  The majority in Adams 
rejected the purpose-based reading of MRE 304(c) in favor of plain meaning and stated that the 
text of the old MRE 304(c) “expressly rejects the concept of extrapolating ‘trustworthiness.’”  
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2. What Relationship Must the Corroborating Evidence Have 
with the Statement? 
The text of the new MRE 304(c) does not limit what facts in a 
statement may be corroborated in order to corroborate the statement as a 
whole.126  Under the old corroboration rule, the essential facts had to be 
corroborated.127  The new MRE 304(c), however, allows corroboration of 
a statement by introducing independent evidence that corroborates any 
facts in the statement, essential or non-essential.128  This means that the 
text of the new rule appears to allow for a statement to be corroborated by 
corroborating facts in the statement that are wholly unrelated to the 
criminal conduct at issue in the case.129 
That being said, federal practice does not allow a statement to be 
corroborated by corroborating unrelated facts in the statement; it requires 
a nexus between the facts being corroborated and the charged criminal 
conduct.130  Although federal courts agree that there must be a nexus 
between the corroborating evidence and the facts admitted, they disagree 
regarding how close the relationship must be between the facts in the 
statement being corroborated and the criminal conduct at issue in the 
case.131  Some courts require that the facts being corroborated relate to the 
 
Id. at 140 n.7.  Unlike extrapolating trustworthiness, using context to corroborate a statement is 
not expressly rejected by the text of the rule.  That being said, a plain meaning-based reading of 
the rule is still unlikely to allow context as part of the corroboration analysis, but a purpose-
based reading of the rule would be more likely to allow consideration of the context in which 
the statement was made to be considered. 
126. 2016 MCM, supra note 75, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c). 
127. See 2012 MCM SUPPLEMENT, supra note 52, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c). 
128. 2016 MCM, supra note 75, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c). 
129. See id. 
130. See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 482 F.3d 669, 673 (4th Cir. 2007) (requiring that 
the corroboration relate to the criminal conduct at issue in the case); United States v. Deville, 
278 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The evidence corroborating a confession must tend to 
connect the accused with the crime.”) (quoting United States v. Abigando, 439 F.2d 827, 832 
(5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 (E.D. Va. 2002) (rejecting the 
argument that a statement as a whole can be corroborated by corroborating peripheral facts in 
the statement and instead requiring “some nexus between” the corroborating evidence and the 
essential facts); United States v. Calhoun, No. 92-2011, 1993 WL 280324, at *3 (6th Cir. July 
26, 1993) (stating that corroboration of some crimes admitted to in a confession does not permit 
“the use of the confession to prove an uncorroborated crime”); United States v. Todd, 657 F.2d 
212, 216 (8th Cir. 1981) (requiring that each crime be individually corroborated even where 
they are related). 
131. Compare Deville, 278 F.3d at 507 (finding that corroboration of one crime 
corroborates a related crime because the crimes are intertwined), with Todd, 657 F.2d at 216–
17 (finding corroboration of one crime does not corroborate two other crimes that are related to 
the corroborated crime). 
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general circumstances surrounding the criminal conduct.132  For those 
courts, corroborating some of the crimes admitted to in the defendant’s 
statement or corroborating the general circumstances surrounding the 
crimes admitted to is sufficient.  For example, if Doe confesses to 
knocking Roe out by punching him in the face and stealing five dollars 
from Roe’s wallet while at Roe’s house, the confession to stealing five 
dollars from Roe could be corroborated by Roe saying Doe punched him, 
Roe’s black eye, and an eyewitness seeing Doe’s car parked outside Roe’s 
house—even if Roe was not sure how much money was in his wallet or if 
any money was taken from him.  However, other courts require that each 
crime charged must be individually corroborated.133  For these courts, 
corroboration of one crime admitted to in a statement does not corroborate 
other crimes admitted to in the same statement which are not themselves 
corroborated.  In the previous example, Doe’s confession to stealing five 
dollars would not be admissible in these courts. 
Military cases prior to Adams generally required the facts being 
corroborated relate to the criminal conduct.134  However, they generally 
did not require independent evidence of each crime charged, but just of 
the general circumstances of the criminal conduct.135 
 
132. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 617 F.3d 857, 863–64 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that 
corroboration of a confession to burglary also corroborates the part of the confession to 
possessing a firearm); United States v. Sterling, 555 F.3d 452, 456–57 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding 
that the statement as a whole was corroborated and admissible despite parts of the statement not 
being otherwise corroborated).  For example, in those courts, if the accused admits to robbing 
and murdering a person, corroboration of the murder can corroborate the larceny without 
independent evidence of the larceny because the two crimes are related.  See North Carolina v. 
Parker, 337 S.E.2d 487, 496–97 (N.C. 1985) (holding that a confession to robbery in the course 
of a murder could be corroborated solely by evidence of the murder). 
133. See, e.g., Stephens, 482 F.3d at 673; Calhoun, 1993 WL 280324, at *3.  For example, 
if the accused admits to robbing and murdering a person and there is corroboration of the murder 
but not of the larceny, the accused’s confession to murder would be adequately corroborated 
and those parts of the statement would be admissible, but the statements confessing to larceny 
would not be admissible because there is no corroboration of the larceny even though they are 
part of one course of conduct.  See Todd, 657 F.2d at 216–18 (finding a confession to murder 
adequately corroborated but not the conspiracy to commit it or the related conspiracy to rob the 
murder victim). 
134. See, e.g., United States v. Seay, 60 M.J. 73, 80 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (finding a confession 
to robbery in the course of a murder adequately corroborated by corroboration of the murder 
and the body being found without a wallet). 
135. See id. at 78, 80 (finding a confession to larceny of a wallet adequately corroborated 
because accused also admitted to murdering the person as part of the larceny and the murder 
was adequately corroborated); United States v. Grant, 56 M.J. 410, 417 (C.A.A.F. 2002) 
(finding a confession to drug use corroborated by another confession to drug use several weeks 
later which was corroborated by a drug screening test).  But see United States v. Rounds, 30 
M.J. 76, 77–78 (C.A.A.F. 1990) (finding that corroboration of the use of one drug did not 
corroborate use of another drug at the same time). 
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Although there is no explicit nexus requirement in the text of the new 
MRE 304(c), in practice some degree of nexus will likely be required.  
What constitutes sufficient corroborating evidence in a particular case is 
an inherently fact-specific inquiry.136  That being said, the facts being 
corroborated must still be sufficiently probative regarding the statement’s 
reliability as a whole, such that they tend to make the statement itself 
trustworthy.  To that end, corroboration of important, significant, or key 
facts in the statement are more probative as to whether the statement as a 
whole is reliable than corroboration of unimportant, ancillary, or 
insignificant facts.137  This is because unimportant facts in the statement 
have little probative value at establishing the reliability of the statement 
as a whole. 
Corroboration of the criminal conduct itself or of facts related to the 
charges in the case are more probative than corroboration of facts that are 
not criminal or which are wholly unrelated to the charges.138  For example, 
if, in addition to confessing to punching and stealing from Roe, Doe also 
confesses to a driving while drunk three months earlier and says that his 
identity was stolen the previous year, corroboration of those incidents is 
much less probative regarding the reliability of Doe’s confession to 
punching and stealing from Roe than the evidence corroborating the 
punch. 
In short, the facts in a statement whose corroboration would be 
probative with regard to the reliability of the statement as a whole are 
likely to be the same facts that qualified as essential facts under the old 
corroboration rule.  This is because those are the facts that are sufficiently 
significant within the context of the statement so as to make the statement 
as a whole reliable.  So, the text of the rule allows for corroboration of a 
statement by corroborating any facts in the statement.  However, in most 
cases, the only facts whose corroboration is likely to meet the burden 
regarding the reliability of the statement are the facts which would have 
been deemed to be essential facts in the statement under the old rule. 
 
136. See United States v. Kirk, 528 F.3d 1102, 1112 (8th Cir. 2008). 
137. See United States v. Dalhouse, 534 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that 
corroboration is usually done by showing that “a few of [the] key assertions” in the statement 
are true); United States v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“[T]he essential 
facts admitted, not peripheral facts unrelated to the crime in prosecution [must be 
corroborated].”); Parker, 337 S.E.2d at 495 (stating that corroboration of insignificant facts is 
insufficient). 
138. For example, in a written statement to law enforcement, corroboration that the 
accused is seventy-one inches tall, as the accused claims in his statement, is less probative as to 
the reliability of his statement as a whole than corroboration that the accused was present at the 
location where he said he committed the crime. 
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3. How Much Evidence is Needed to Corroborate a Statement? 
The quantum of evidence needed to corroborate a confession or 
admission remains largely unchanged.139  The new rule states that the 
corroborating evidence “need raise only an inference of the truth of the 
admission or confession.”140  The independent evidence does not have to 
prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of 
the evidence.141  Although Opper required “substantial independent 
evidence,”142 the old MRE 304(c) did not incorporate the word substantial 
and required only independent evidence.143  As a result, military case law 
required that the amount of independent evidence needed to only be 
“slight”144 or even “very slight.”145  The new MRE 304(c) similarly omits 
the word substantial and requires only independent evidence.146 
Although the quantum of evidence remains unchanged, the new 
standard itself, “tend to establish the trustworthiness,” is also a statement 
regarding the amount of evidence needed.147  The corroborating evidence 
must both raise an inference of the truth of the statement and tend to 
establish the trustworthiness of it.148  Despite this additional requirement, 
tending to establish trustworthiness is also a low standard.149  The 
evidence does not have to actually establish the trustworthiness of the 
statement, but only tend to do so.150  Corroboration does not have to verify 
facts contained in an accused’s statement, it only has to be consistent with 
them.151  Because “tend to establish” and “raise an inference” are both low 
 
139. Compare 2012 MCM SUPPLEMENT, supra note 52, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c)(4), and 
2016 MCM, supra note 75, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c)(4), with 2012 MCM, supra note 6, at MIL. 
R. EVID. 304(g) (repealed 2014). 
140. 2016 MCM, supra note 75, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c)(4). 
141. Id.; United States v. Cottrill, 45 M.J. 485, 489 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (citing United States 
v. Maio, 34 M.J. 215, 218 n.1 (C.M.A. 1992)). 
142. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954) (emphasis added). 
143. See 2012 MCM SUPPLEMENT, supra note 52, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c); United States 
v. Adams, 74 M.J. 137, 140 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
144. Adams, 74 M.J. at 140 (citations omitted); United States v. Yeoman, 25 M.J. 1, 4 
(C.M.A. 1987) (citations omitted). 
145. United States v. Melvin, 26 M.J. 145, 146 (C.M.A. 1988) (citations omitted). 
146. See 2016 MCM, supra note 75, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c)(1). 
147. Id. (emphasis added). 
148. See id. at 304(1)–(2). 
149. See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 237 (4th Cir. 2008).  “[E]xtrinsic proof 
[i]s sufficient which merely fortifies the truth of the confession[s], without independently 
establishing the crime charged.”  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 489 (1963)). 
150. See id. 
151. See United States v. Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
corroborating evidence is evidence which “fortifies, augments, or supports” the confession or 
admission). 
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burdens, it is unlikely that the standard has changed in a practical sense, 
and prior military case law regarding the amount of evidence needed 
likely remains applicable. 
B. The Return of Essential Facts 
Although attempting to analyze the meaning of the new MRE 304(c) 
provides few definite answers, the analysis here cautions against 
interpreting the changes broadly.  The ultimate object of corroboration has 
changed from picking out what facts are important enough to be deemed 
essential and then corroborating each of those essential facts in the 
statement for that part of the statement to be admissible, to corroborating 
facts in the statement as a means of corroborating the statement itself.  
One-for-one corroboration of each essential fact is gone, in favor of a 
tipping point where, once there is sufficient independent evidence which 
tends to make the statement itself trustworthy, the entire statement is 
admissible.  Where that tipping point is located is dependent on the 
circumstances of the individual case as well as the quality and quantity of 
the corroborating evidence. 
While the rule allows for the corroboration of any fact in the 
statement, the requirement that the facts being corroborated are probative 
with regard to the reliability of the statement as a whole limits the number 
of facts that are significant within the context of the statement.  If the facts 
being corroborated are insignificant, those facts are unlikely to be 
sufficiently probative when establishing the trustworthiness of the 
statement.  This amounts to a de facto return to picking out and 
corroborating the essential facts in the statement.  However, rather than 
corroborating every essential fact as required by the text of the old rule 
and Adams, the text of the new MRE 304(c) codifies a version of the prior 
purpose-based reading of the rule like the one used by military courts prior 
to Adams and, to some degree, allows for the corroborating evidence to 
“bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense ‘through’ the 
statements of the accused.”152 
V. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE FINAL ANALYSIS 
After the C.A.A.F.’s holding in Adams, MRE 304(c) was quickly 
amended in response.  Congress clearly expressed its intent for how the 
rule should be amended—“to conform to the rules governing the 
admissibility of the corroboration of admissions and confessions in the 
 
152. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954). 
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trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.”153  However, 
because the corroboration rule is not a monolith and there are significant 
variations in the rule within federal practice, this intent to follow federal 
practice is itself ambiguous—which formulation of the rule should be 
used?  Was the intent to go as far as possible and adopt the most 
permissive version of the corroboration rule, or was it to simply do as little 
as possible to merely overturn the requirement of one-for-one essential 
fact corroboration?  Because of the ambiguity, and because there are so 
many variations on the corroboration rule in federal courts, it is not 
possible to know whether the rule actually goes as far as Congress 
intended.  In many respects, the text of the rule does not clearly articulate 
what methods of corroboration it embraces.  It will thus be for the courts 
to decide how far the new corroboration rule goes. 
Despite questions regarding the text of the rule and the intent behind 
it, the rule must still be interpreted.  Although the rule now allows for 
corroboration of a statement by corroborating any facts in the statement, 
practically speaking, the only facts for which corroboration would be 
probative for meeting the new standard of tending to establish the 
trustworthiness of the statement are likely to be the essential facts 
contained in the statement.  In practice, therefore, the new MRE 304(c) 
does nothing more than was necessary to overrule the requirement in 
Adams and under the text of the old rule that each essential fact be 
individually corroborated.  Rather than requiring that every essential fact 
be corroborated and excising those that are not from the statement, once 
sufficient essential facts are corroborated, the statement as a whole is 
admissible.  Thus, the new MRE 304(c) is just a repackaged version of the 
old, purpose-based, corroboration rule followed by military courts prior to 
Adams of corroborating some essential facts in the statement as a means 
of making the statement as a whole trustworthy and admissible. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite being a “dusty doctrine of criminal law,”154 military courts 
and Congress have blown the dust off of the corroboration rule in the past 
few years.  Like the old version of the rule, the new version is similarly 
easy to superficially understand and difficult to apply, especially in close 
cases.  There is bound to be significant litigation over this rule in the future 
as military courts struggle to interpret and apply the new rule much as they 
struggled to interpret and apply the old formulation of the rule for the 
previous fifty years.  Ultimately, it will be up to the courts to face the 
 
153. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 545, 
129 Stat. 726, 820 (2015). 
154. United States v. Brown, 617 F.3d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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ambiguity in the rule and in the intent behind it, and to determine how 
broadly or narrowly to read it. 
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APPENDIX A: MRE 304(G) (MRE 304(C) PRIOR TO MAY 20, 2016)155 
1.  Rule 304(g) 
(g)  Corroboration.  An admission or a confession of the accused 
may be considered as evidence against the accused on the question of guilt 
or innocence only if independent evidence, either direct or circumstantial, 
has been introduced that corroborates the essential facts admitted to justify 
sufficiently an inference of their truth.  Other uncorroborated confessions 
or admissions of the accused that would themselves require corroboration 
may not be used to supply this independent evidence.  If the independent 
evidence raises an inference of the truth of some but not all of the essential 
facts admitted, then the confession or admission may be considered as 
evidence against the accused only with respect to those essential facts 
stated in the confession or admission that are corroborated by the 
independent evidence.  Corroboration is not required for a statement made 
by the accused before the court by which the accused is being tried, for 
statements made prior to or contemporaneously with the act, or for 
statements offered under a rule of evidence other than that pertaining to 
the admissibility of admissions or confessions. 
(1)  Quantum of evidence needed.  The independent evidence 
necessary to establish corroboration need not be sufficient of itself to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of facts stated in the 
admission or confession.  The independent evidence need raise only an 
inference of the truth of the essential facts admitted.  The amount and type 
of evidence introduced as corroboration is a factor to be considered by the 
trier of fact in determining the weight, if any, to be given to the admission 
or confession. 
(2)  Procedure.  The military judge alone shall determine when 
adequate evidence of corroboration has been received.  Corroborating 
evidence usually is to be introduced before the admission or confession is 
introduced but the military judge may admit evidence subject to later 
corroboration. 
  
 
155. 2012 MCM, supra note 6. 
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APPENDIX B: MRE 304(C), AS AMENDED MAY 20, 2016156 
 1.  Rule 304(c) 
(c)  Corroboration of a Confession or Admission. 
(1)  An admission or a confession of the accused may be considered 
as evidence against the accused on the question of guilt or innocence only 
if independent evidence, either direct or circumstantial, has been admitted 
into evidence that would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the 
admission or confession. 
(2)  Other uncorroborated confessions or admissions of the accused 
that would themselves require corroboration may not be used to supply 
this independent evidence.  If the independent evidence raises an inference 
of the truth of the admission or confession, then it may be considered as 
evidence against the accused.  Not every element or fact contained in the 
confession or admission must be independently proven for the confession 
or admission to be admitted into evidence in its entirety. 
(3)  Corroboration is not required for a statement made by the accused 
before the court by which the accused is being tried, for statements made 
prior to or contemporaneously with the act, or for statements offered under 
a rule of evidence other than that pertaining to the admissibility of 
admissions or confessions. 
(4)  Quantum of Evidence Needed.  The independent evidence 
necessary to establish corroboration need not be sufficient of itself to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of facts stated in the 
admission or confession.  The independent evidence need raise only an 
inference of the truth of the admission or confession.  The amount and 
type of evidence introduced as corroboration is a factor to be considered 
by the trier of fact in determining the weight, if any, to be given to the 
admission or confession. 
(5)  Procedure.  The military judge alone is to determine when 
adequate evidence of corroboration has been received.  Corroborating 
evidence must be introduced before the admission or confession is 
introduced unless the military judge allows submission of such evidence 
subject to later corroboration. 
2.  Analysis of MRE 304.157 
 
156. 2016 MCM, supra note 75, at MIL. R. EVID. 304(c). 
157. Id. app. A22-10 to -12. 
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2016 Amendment: This change brings military practice in line with 
federal practice.158  
 
158. See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 151–57 (1954); Opper v. United States, 
348 U.S. 84, 93–95 (1954). 
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APPENDIX C: MRE 304(C) LINE-IN/LINE-OUT 
1.  MRE 304(c) with amendments promulgated by the President on 
May 20, 2016.159 
2.  Omitted language is shown as stricken. 
3.  New language is shown as italicized. 
4.  Text: 
(c)  Corroboration of a Confession or Admission. 
(1)  An admission or a confession of the accused may be considered 
as evidence against the accused on the question of guilt or innocence only 
if independent evidence, either direct or circumstantial, has been 
introduced admitted into evidence that would tend to establish the 
trustworthiness of the admission or confession corroborates the essential 
facts admitted to justify sufficiently an inference of their truth. 
(2)  Other uncorroborated confessions or admissions of the accused 
that would themselves require corroboration may not be used to supply 
this independent evidence.  If the independent evidence raises an inference 
of the truth of the admission or confession, then it may be considered as 
evidence against the accused of some but not all of the essential facts 
admitted, then the confession or admission may be considered as evidence 
against the accused only with respect to those essential facts stated in the 
confession or admission that are corroborated by the independent 
evidence.  Not every element or fact contained in the confession or 
admission must be independently proven for the confession or admission 
to be admitted into evidence in its entirety. 
(3)  Corroboration is not required for a statement made by the accused 
before the court by which the accused is being tried, for statements made 
prior to or contemporaneously with the act, or for statements offered under 
a rule of evidence other than that pertaining to the admissibility of 
admissions or confessions. 
(4)  Quantum of Evidence Needed.  The independent evidence 
necessary to establish corroboration need not be sufficient of itself to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of facts stated in the 
admission or confession.  The independent evidence need raise only an 
inference of the truth of the admission or confession essential facts 
admitted.  The amount and type of evidence introduced as corroboration 
is a factor to be considered by the trier of fact in determining the weight, 
if any, to be given to the admission or confession.  
 
159. See Order 13,730, supra note 1.  Compare 2016 MCM, supra note 75, at MIL. R. 
EVID. 304(c), with 2012 MCM, supra note 6. 
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(5)  Procedure.  The military judge alone is to shall determine when 
adequate evidence of corroboration has been received.  Corroborating 
evidence must be usually is to be introduced before the admission or 
confession is introduced unless but the military judge allows submission 
of such may admit evidence subject to later corroboration. 
